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The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act’s 
Incorporation “Incentive”
Michael S. Knoll, JD, PhD
The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA), hastily passed by Congress and signed into law 
by President Trump in December 2017, appears to have shifted business owners’ 
incentives.1 
In particular, the TCJA seems to encourage owners of 
successful businesses structured as sole proprietorships 
or passthrough entities to incorporate their busi-
nesses.2  The advantage of owning a business through 
corporation is said to stem from (1) the relatively low 
corporate tax rate (21 percent), as compared with the 
maximum personal tax rate on ordinary income (37 
percent), and (2) the deferral of individual-level tax. 
According to its critics, the TCJA will drive wealthy 
business owners to restructure their businesses and 
use their new corporations as pocketbook investment 
vehicles to invest in and hold portfolio investments, 
substantially reducing wealthy individuals’ tax obliga-
tions and Treasury’s tax collections.3  
As a result of the TCJA, the long-held wisdom 
that passthrough entities are tax advantaged relative to 
subchapter C corporations is being questioned. And 
business owners—encouraged by academics, com-
mentators, and consultants—are seriously considering 
converting their passthrough entities to corporations. 
Recent articles that model choice of entity under 
the TCJA further support the view that there will be 
a large shift from the passthrough to the corporate 
form.4  The choice of entity decision is now more 
complicated and the consensus is that there are many 
SUMMARY
• Many observers have asserted that the reduced corporate tax 
rate instituted by the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act will incentiv-
ize owners of businesses structured as sole proprietorships or 
passthrough entities to incorporate their businesses and use 
these new corporations as pocketbook investment vehicles to 
invest in and hold portfolio investments, substantially reducing 
wealthy individuals’ tax obligations and Treasury’s tax collections.
• This brief offers a different view, and discusses why predic-
tions of widespread conversions to the corporate form at a 
substantial cost to the fiscal position of the U.S. are overstated.
• The brief explores the various purported tax advantages to 
incorporating, both when business owners are looking to in-
vest substantial profits in portfolio assets, as well as when 
retained earnings are reinvested in the business and produce 
ordinary income.
• Ultimately, for most businesses, the tax benefits from switching 
from a passthrough entity to a C corporation are nonexistent, 
speculative, or small. Consequently, tax collections are not likely 
to change much from businesses switching to the corporate 
form—at least for now. If certain provisions of the TCJA are not 
extended by Congress in the coming years, the tax advantages 
of incorporation could increase.
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situations in which the corporate form 
would be tax preferred relative to a 
passthrough structure.5  
This Issue Brief—a synthesis of 
two Tax Notes articles—takes a dif-
ferent position. Put simply, and in the 
words of the Roman storyteller Pha-
edrus, “the first appearance deceives 
many.” For several reasons discussed 
in this brief, the general claim that 
there will be a mass conversion of 
passthrough entities into C corpora-
tions is, in fact, doubtful. Ultimately, 
predictions of widespread conversions 
to the corporate form at a substantial 
cost to the fiscal position of the U.S. 
are overstated.
THE TWO PRINCIPAL 
SOURCES OF PRESUMED 
ADVANTAGE FOR 
INCORPORATING
1. RATE CHANGES 
Under pre-2018 tax law, busi-
ness owners had little tax incentive to 
incorporate. The total tax on retained 
earnings eventually distributed to 
shareholders was 7.6 percentage 
points higher than the tax on income 
earned through passthrough entities. 
That difference was a large disadvan-
tage for business owners to overcome 
if they were going to use corporations 
for tax deferral. 
Once the TCJA provisions came 
into effect, incorporation became 
relatively more favorable. The total tax 
rate on passthrough earnings is now 
37 percent—the top individual tax 
rate—down from 39.6 percent. The 
total tax rate on corporate earnings 
distributed immediately as dividends 
is now 36.8 percent.6  Hence, when 
all income is used for current con-
sumption, the total tax burden on 
income earned through corporate and 
passthrough entities is now almost 
equal, with the corporate form enjoy-
ing a tiny advantage.
This is illustrated in Table 1, which 
assumes there is $1,000 of pretax 
income going toward immediate con-
sumption for a recipient in the top tax 
bracket. When the taxpayer’s business 
is a passthrough entity, the taxpayer 
will be taxed on all $1,000 of earned 
income. If the taxpayer receives a divi-
dend, the corporation pays corporate 
income tax, and then the dividend is 
taxed to the individual recipient at 
20 percent. The end result is that the 
taxpayer who received a dividend can 
spend only 0.31 percent more than 
the taxpayer who owns a passthrough 
entity. Alternatively, if the individual 
is paid a $1,000 salary, the corporation 
has no income and hence no corporate 
income tax liability. The individual 
who receives the salary pays income 
tax and is left with the same amount 
to spend as an owner of a passthrough 
entity. 
That doesn’t exhaust all possi-
  1 See, e.g., Reuven S. Avi-Yonah et al., “The Games They Will 
Play: Tax Games, Roadblocks and Glitches Under the House 
and Senate Tax Bills” (Dec. 7, 2017). 
  2 Some commentators emphasize that the post-TCJA bal-
ance between passthrough entities and C corporations 
depends on a party’s circumstances. A list of references 
is available in footnote 3 of Michael S. Knoll (2019), “The 
TCJA and the Questionable Incentive to Incorporate,” Tax 
Notes, Vol. 162, No. 9, pp. 977-986. That paper is the basis 
of this Issue Brief, along with Michael S. Knoll (2019), “The 
TCJA and the Questionable Incentive to Incorporate, Part 
2,” Tax Notes, Vol. 162, No. 12, pp. 1447-1461.
  3 See, e.g., Avi-Yonah et al., supra note 1. 
  4 Penn Wharton Budget Model, (2018), “Projecting the Mass 
Conversion from Pass-Through Entities to C-Corporations.” 
  5 Supra note 2.
  6 This 36.8 percent figure is the sum of the 21 percent 
corporate tax rate and 15.8 percent, which is the product 
of the 20 percent individual tax rate and the 79 percent of 
pretax earnings left in the corporation after payment of the 
corporate tax.
  7 Section 199A(a). The provision is temporary through the 
end of 2025.
  8 A QTB is any trade or business other than the performance 
of services as an employee. Because holding portfolio 
investments is not considered a trade or business, income 
from portfolio investments is not eligible for the deduction.
  9 Section 1411 provides for a 3.8 percent surtax on net 
investment income of certain high earners with substantial 
investment income. 
10 Knoll, “Part 2,” supra note 2 (Table 3).
11 Section 243 provides corporations with a 50 percent 
dividends received deduction for dividends received from 
NOTES
TABLE 1: CONSUMPTION WITH DIFFERENT ENTITIES
Passthrough Entity C Corporation
No Section 199A Section 199A Dividend Salary 
Corporate income   $1,000
Corporate tax   $210
Individual income $1,000 $1,000 $790 $1,000
Individual tax $370 $296 $158 $370
Net consumption $630 $704 $632 $630
Percentage difference  11.75% 0.31% 0
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bilities, however, because the TCJA 
created a new category of income 
for tax purposes under the so-called 
passthrough provision of section 
199A. Among the most controversial 
provisions of the TCJA, section 199A 
gives owners of unincorporated busi-
nesses a 20 percent deduction on their 
qualified business income (QBI).7  
For an individual in the top tax 
bracket, the section 199A deduction 
can reduce the marginal tax rate by 
7.4 percentage points, from 37 percent 
to 29.6 percent. The section 199A 
deduction is unavailable to employees 
and corporations, but it is available 
to sole proprietorships and owners of 
passthrough entities that are qualified 
trades or businesses (QTBs).8  
For taxpayers who can take 
advantage of the section 199A 
deduction, a passthrough entity can 
deliver substantially more consump-
tion than can a corporation. In Table 
1, a top-bracket owner of a success-
ful passthrough entity who can take 
full advantage of section 199A can 
consume 11.75 percent more than 
can a passthrough entity without the 
deduction. 
2. DEFERRAL 
Because it can be quite valu-
able, deferral drives the most preva-
lent argument for incorporation. 
When a portion of income is saved 
and invested, the corporate form 
appears more tax-friendly than the 
passthrough form, since the personal 
tax on long-term capital gains and 
qualified dividends can be deferred, 
possibly indefinitely, within a corpo-
ration. Although the principal and 
income will be taxed later, in the 
interim the additional money that 
would have gone to pay taxes immedi-
ately with a passthrough entity can be 
invested through the corporation and 
earn a return. The after-tax portion of 
that return is said to be the source of 
the tax advantage from incorporation. 
However, there is actually a small 
disadvantage to using a corpora-
tion rather than a passthrough entity 
(without a section 199A deduction) 
as a vehicle to invest in portfolio 
assets, as illustrated in Table 2. Table 2 
shows the amount of money a busi-
ness owner can spend in 10 years 
from $1,000 of pretax income that is 
invested at a 10 percent annual pretax 
rate of return. It assumes that all 
investment income is taxed at the end 
of 10 years when the investment will 
be liquidated.
This small disadvantage is an 
important and surprising point. 
Despite a relatively long holding 
period and a relatively high rate of 
return, the initial larger investment 
fund with a C corporation still does 
not yield a larger amount available 
for consumption. That result directly 
conflicts with claims about the TCJA’s 
incorporation incentive, and it prob-
ably conflicts with the intuition of 
many tax specialists. 
The explanation, however, is sim-
ple. The imposition of the 21 percent 
corporate tax on investment income 
almost exactly offsets the benefit of 
the deferred 20 percent individual-
level tax when investment income is 
earned through the corporation. With 
earnings taxed twice—once at the 
corporate level and then later at the 
individual level—the deferral benefit 
disappears.
At current tax rates, there are 
(roughly) no differences in the tax 
burdens of different organizational 
forms, assuming the section 199A 
deduction is unavailable. Accordingly, 
successful professionals and wealthy 
business owners cannot substantially 
reduce their tax burdens by convert-
ing their passthrough businesses to 
corporations, regardless of whether 
all income is paid out as earned or 
some income is reinvested in portfolio 
assets. 
firms where the recipient has an ownership share below 
20 percent.
12 Although historically dividends have accounted for more 
than two-fifths of total return, in the 2010s dividends have 
so far accounted for much less, about one-sixth of total 
return. Ben Reynolds, “S&P 500 Dividend Yield: Past, Pres-
ent, Future,” Sure Dividend, Aug. 9, 2018. 
13 Section 1014 provides as a general rule that the basis of 
property received from a decedent is the fair market value 
of the property at the time of the decedent’s death (or the 
alternate valuation date).
14 Section 1202.
15 Knoll, “Part 2,” supra note 2.
16 Ibid. For the full analysis, see section IV.
17 The TCJA provides a general allowance of expenditures for 
businesses regardless of size. Under section 179, small 
and medium-size businesses can deduct up to $1 million 
a year before having to capitalize and depreciate their in-
vestment expenditures. And through 2022, section 168(k) 
allows all businesses to take 100 percent bonus deprecia-
tion on most investments other than real estate, which also 
produces an immediate deduction. 
18 E.g., Joseph Bankman, “Silicon Valley Start-Ups,” 41 
UCLA L. Rev. 1737 (1994); Victor Fleischer, “The Rational 
Exuberance of Structuring Venture Capital Start-Ups,” 57 
Tax L. Rev. 137 (2003); Larry Ribstein, The Rise of the 
Uncorporation 13 (2010); and Gregg D. Polsky and Adam 
Rosenzweig, “The Up-C Revolution,” 71 Tax L. Rev. 415 
(2018). 
19 The incorporations of private equity companies KKR 
and Ares Capital post-TCJA are prominent examples of 
passthrough businesses incorporating not to reduce their 




FOUR OTHER (POTENTIAL) 
TAX ADVANTAGES OF 
INCORPORATING
Other tax provisions could still 
make the corporate form more tax 
efficient when business owners are 
looking to invest substantial proceeds 
in portfolio investments. Although 
none of these provisions are likely 
to yield large tax advantages from 
incorporation, here are four possible 
sources of advantage:
1. THE MEDICARE TAX
Corporations—unlike high-
bracket taxpayers —are not subject 
to the 3.8 percent Medicare tax.9  
The Medicare tax is imposed on a 
corporation only when it pays wages 
to its employees or dividends to its 
shareholders (or when shareholders 
sell their shares and realize capital 
gains). Unlike the previous result 
with income taxes—in which the tax 
benefit from deferring the individual 
income tax was almost exactly offset 
by the corporate tax on the income 
from retained earnings—there is no 
Medicare tax imposed at the corporate 
level that would eliminate the benefit 
from using a corporation to defer the 
Medicare tax. Therefore, because of 
the Medicare tax, there is a modest tax 
benefit from incorporation and invest-
ing retained earnings, and it is quan-
tifiable. The amount that a taxpayer 
(who cannot take advantage of the 
section 199A deduction) can con-
sume after 10 years is slightly higher, 
between 2 and 4.4 percent, when the 
investment earns 10 percent annually 
and is made through a corporation.10 
2. INTEREST AND DIVIDENDS
Corporations are taxed at lower 
rates than individuals on some forms 
of investment income. For example, on 
interest income, corporations are taxed 
at the corporate rate of 21 percent, 
whereas individuals are taxed at ordi-
nary income rates of up to 37 percent. 
Further, corporations that hold shares 
in other corporations are eligible for 
a dividends received deduction of up 
to 50 percent.11  Regarding interest 
income, however, corporations and 
high-bracket investors are rarely the 
proper tax clientele for taxable bonds. 
And as for the dividends received 
deduction, dividends have accounted 
for only a small portion of the total 
return from holding stocks in recent 
years,12  thereby reducing the tax ben-
efit from investing in stocks through a 
corporation. 
3. STEP-UP IN BASIS
The step-up in basis at death can 
eliminate the individual-level tax on 
both business profits and investment 
income.13  The effect of the step-up 
is to wipe out the decedent’s accumu-
lated capital gain upon her death. But 
in general, it is not clear whether the 
tax benefit from the step-up in basis 
the tax costs of converting are minimal, if any. Joshua 
Franklin, “Private equity firm KKR opts to become C-Corp 
after U.S. tax reform,” Reuters, May 3, 2018.
20 Only in special circumstances (such as owners planning 
to hold large amounts of high-dividend, high-interest, 
low-capital gains assets until death) will switching from a 
passthrough entity to a C corporation likely lead to a large 
reduction in taxes.
NOTES
TABLE 2: ALL INVESTMENT INCOME IS TAX DEFERRED
Passthrough Entity C Corporation
No Section 199A Section 199A Dividend Salary 
Investment grows to $1,634.06 $1,825.99 $2,049.06 $2,049.06
Corporate tax   $264.40
Payment (not grossed up) $1,634.06 $1,825.99 $1,784.64 $1,000
Payment (grossed up)    $2,259.06
Dividend/investment tax $200.81 $224 $365.93  
Ordinary tax    $835.85
Net consumption $1,433.25 $1,601.60 $1,427.72 $1,423.21
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at death is greater with passthrough 
entities or with C corporations. The 
value of the step-up on unrealized 
income is greater with passthrough 
entities than with corporations. 
Conversely, the potential tax saving on 
realized income is greater with corpo-
rations than with passthrough entities. 
The answer in any specific case likely 
depends on the party’s circumstances. 
4. QSBS EXCLUSION
A final proffered rationale for 
favoring C corporations is the quali-
fied small business stock (QSBS) 
exclusion, which allows individual 
taxpayers to exclude from federal tax 
100 percent of their gain on the sale 
of qualified corporations’ shares.14  
However, because the exclusion and 
the incorporation incentive it creates 
precede the TCJA businesses seek-
ing to take advantage of the deduc-
tion were likely already C corpora-
tions before the TCJA was enacted. 
Moreover, the QSBS exclusion does 
not make a corporation an effective 
vehicle for portfolio investments; it 
actually has the opposite effect.15 
REINVESTING IN THE 
BUSINESS
The discussion thus far has 
focused on situations in which busi-
ness owners invest some of their 
profits in portfolio assets. If, however, 
a business’s owners were to plow their 
earnings back into the business in a 
way that produced ordinary income, 
the tax benefits from incorporation 
would appear to increase substantially. 
This is because the 20 percent invest-
ment tax on dividends replaces the 
individual-level ordinary income tax 
with rates as high as 37 percent. 
Assuming, again, a 10-year hold-
ing period and a 10 percent annual 
rate of return, the benefits potentially 
available from using a corporation 
rather than a passthrough entity when 
retained earnings are reinvested in 
the business and produce ordinary 
income are large—as high as 16.4 to 
22.4 percent.16  This suggests that the 
strongest case for using a corpora-
tion post-TCJA is not as a corporate 
pocketbook to reinvest earnings in 
portfolio investments, but rather as 
a vehicle to reinvest earnings in the 
business when the business’s owners 
cannot take the section 199A deduc-
tion and the reinvestment produces 
ordinary income. 
However, even here there might 
not be an advantage from incorporat-
ing. Implicit in the discussion of the 
tax benefit from reinvesting is that 
the reinvested proceeds generate some 
immediate tax liability, whether the 
reinvestment occurs through a cor-
poration or a passthrough entity. As 
is widely recognized, an immediate 
deduction of the full amount invested 
is equivalent to exempting the return 
on that investment from tax—regard-
less of the tax rate—assuming that the 
tax rate is constant (and making some 
other common assumptions). Accord-
ingly, for there to be a tax benefit 
from incorporating, the reinvested 
expenditures cannot be immediately 
deductible. 
But under current law, most 
expenditures are immediately deduct-
ible for many businesses.17  Therefore, 
at least for now, there is only a very 
small (1.69 percent) tax advantage 
from using the corporation to reinvest 
profits in a business, even if that rein-
vestment produces ordinary income. 
This is illustrated in Table 3 (which 
includes the Medicare tax). 
WHICH BUSINESSES WILL 
CONVERT?
The two most salient questions 
remain: what kinds of businesses are 
most likely to be converted into C 
corporations, and how large of an 
impact will those conversions have on 
tax collections? As for the first ques-
tion:
• Business owners who can take 
the section 199A deduction will prob-
ably pay substantially higher taxes if 
they incorporate. 
• Those who consume all income 
as it is earned will see only a small 
decrease in their taxes from incorpo-
rating, most of which will come from 
the corporate tax being excluded from 
the Medicare tax base.
• Business owners who invest a 
portion of their income in portfolio 
assets will likely be only slightly better 
off by incorporating. However, the 
deferral of the individual tax from 
investing retained profits in portfo-
lio assets will not generate any tax 
savings.  Again, the advantage comes 
from the Medicare tax. And for busi-
nesses with multiple owners, there 
would be pressure for all the owners 
to save through the corporation in 
proportion to their share ownership 
and for all shareholders to have the 
same investment portfolio. 
• Similarly, the owners of profit-
able businesses that reinvest in the 
6
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business and produce ordinary income 
are only slightly better off owning 
their businesses through corporations 
because of the current widespread avail-
ability of immediate expensing for busi-
ness investments, which defers taxation 
until distribution.  However, as 100 
percent bonus depreciation—a feature 
that is equivalent to immediate expens-
ing—phases out and is eliminated, the 
potential benefits from incorporation to 
businesses that reinvest their earnings 
in the business increase.
• Finally, there is a tax risk from 
incorporation that must also be con-
sidered. If a corporate payment is taxed 
as compensation (not as a distribution) 
and the corporation does not have tax-
able income that can be offset by the 
payment, the corporate form can be at 
a large tax disadvantage relative to the 
passthrough form. That is because the 
ordinary tax on the payment is not par-
tially offset by the corporation’s deduc-
tion. 
Despite these findings, businesses 
historically have had a tendency to 
adopt the corporate form even when a 
passthrough entity is more tax effi-
cient.18  That tendency appears to be 
especially strong for businesses that are 
looking to raise venture capital funding 
or rely heavily on equity-based com-
pensation. In other words, businesses 
with ambitious growth goals tend to be 
incorporated even if there is a sub-
stantial tax cost for doing so. For these 
businesses, the TCJA likely lowers the 
tax disadvantage. Since many of these 
companies are already incorporated, 
however, it is not clear that many busi-
nesses that would have continued (or 
started) as passthrough entities if the 
old tax law had remained in place will 
incorporate.19  Under these circum-
stances, and in response to the second 
question, tax collections are not likely to 
change much from businesses switching 
to the corporate form. 
Ultimately, for most businesses 
the tax benefits from switching from 
a passthrough entity to a C corpora-
tion are nonexistent, speculative, or 
small.20   Accordingly, despite being 
unable to offer numerical estimates, it is 
hard to see the TCJA causing a rush to 
incorporate and a substantial loss of tax 
revenue—at least for now. If, however, 
Congress does not extend the current 
37 percent top tax rate for top-bracket 
taxpayers, the benefit of incorpora-
tion would rise from 0.2 percent to 2.8 
percent (without taking into account 
the Medicare tax) in 2026. In addition, 
more taxpayers would stand to benefit 
from incorporation if the section 199A 
deduction disappears at the end of 2025 
and as bonus depreciation phases out, 
unless those provisions are extended. 
FINAL THOUGHTS
In the current tax environment, 
which was created by the TCJA, small 
differences can shift the balance in 
favor of one form of entity over another. 
Accordingly, business owners seeking 
to choose the most tax-efficient entity 
need to know more than ever before; 
they cannot simply fixate on one or two 
factors. They are compelled to try to 
predict the future, too. The challenge 
in making the incorporation decision 
stems from the fact that the corporate 
tax benefits are quantifiable, while the 
tax benefits of a sole proprietorship, 
for example, are based on difficult-to-
model anticipations of future realities—
both in terms of the owners’ income 
and investment opportunities and 
changes in the tax law.
As a result of the TCJA, which 
brought the tax consequences of 
passthrough entities and corporations 
closer together, the game of identify-
ing the most tax-efficient structure to 
use for a successful business is afoot.  
However, given the modest tax benefits 
potentially available to many firms in a 
wide range of circumstances, the game 
might not be worth the candle.
TABLE 3: REINVESTMENT WITH IMMEDIATE EXPENSING  
Passthrough Entity Corporation
No Section 199A Section 199A Dividend Salary 
Net investment $1,000 $1,000 $1,000 $1,000
Grows to $2,593.74 $2,593.74 $2,593.74 $2,593.74
Corporate tax   $544.69
Dividend tax   $487.68
Ordinary tax $1,058.25 $866.31  $1,058.25
Net consumption $1,535.50 $1,727.43 $1,561.38 $1,535.50
Percentage difference  12.50% 1.69% 0%
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